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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HARLEY R. BRUNDAGE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IML FREIGHT, INC., SPECIAL 
FUND OF UTAH, and THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,: 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 16972 
This is a Workmen's Compensation Act case dealing with 
a claim filed by plaintiff on appeal, Harley Brundage, against 
his defendant employer, IML Freight, Inc., and the defendant 
Second Injury or Special Fund of §§35-1-68 and 35-1-69 
U.C.A. for injuries he suffered on June 18, 1977 (R. 113) 
arising out of or in the course of his employment. Plaintiff 
alleges that the combination of a pre-existing ·physical im-
pairment coupled with the physical impairment from the indus-
trial injury makes him unemployable and therefore permanently 
and totally disabled pursuant to §35-1-67 U.C.A. 
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DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
On ~anuary 24, 1980, an Administrative Law Judge entered 
an Order which granted certain benefits to plaintiff but 
denied the claim for permanent total disability benefits 
(R. 528-535) Plaintiff timely filed a Motion for Review of 
that Order. (R. 537-545) The Motion for Review was denied on 
a review by the Industrial Commissioners in a most unusual 
manner. One Commissioner concluded that the evidence supported 
plaintiff's claim of permanent and total disability. One 
Commissioner was of the opinion the decision of the Administrativ 
Law Judge should be affirmed. The third Commissioner disqualifi 
himself from participation for personal reasons. (R. 548-
549) 
Plaintiff thereafter filed a Petition for Writ of Review 
(R. 550-551) and a Writ of Review issued (R. 552-553) bringing 
this matter before the Supreme Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff requests a reversal of the Industrial Commis-
sion's denial of benefits plaintiff should be entitled to 
receive as a permanently and totally disabled workman pursuant 
to §35-1-67 U.C.A. as the unrebutted and irrefutable evidence 
makes the denial arbitrary and capricious. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Harley Brundage, was born January 30, 
1924. (R. 104) He has spent 30 years of his adult life 
employed as a truck driver, the last 17 years of which he was 
-2-
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employed with defendant IML Freight. ( R • 10 5) He has 
achieved a formal education of 8 years plus one year of night 
classes in auto mechanics courses that he did not complete. 
( R. 106) His work life has been spent entirely as a manual 
laborer or as a truck driver. (R. 106) 
In August of 1975 in a nonwork related event plaintiff 
injured his back while starting the motor on his fishing boat. 
(R. 106) He ultimately was referred to Dr. Charles Rich, 
a neurosurgeon, who, in October of 1975, operated on plaintiff 
to remove intervertebral disc material at the L3-4 level in 
his back. (R. 109-110) 
Though he was never completely free from pain following 
the operation, plaintiff improved enough to be released to 
return to work and pass the Interstate Commerce Commission 
physical examination in October of 1976. (R. 110-111) 
Thereafter, he was able to work regularly until June 18, 1977. 
(R. 111, 113). 
on June 18, 1977 while in the course of his employment 
with IML Freight, Mr Brundage again injured his back. This 
time he was in Madison, Iowa unloading 50 pound bags of potatoes 
from his truck. In the process of taking one particular bag 
from the top of a 6 foot high stack he twisted while bending 
to put the bag down. He immediately experienced severe pain 
in the lower back and into both legs. The pain was grave 
enough that he was forced to lay on the floor of the trailer 
for fifteen minutes before his co-driver could assist 
-3-
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him out of the trailer. The next day the company flew him 
back to Salt Lake. (R. 113-116) 
Upon plaintiff's return to Salt Lake, the company doctor 
referred him to orthopedic surgeon, Dr. A.F. Martin. After 
a short period of unsuccessful conservative management of 
his condition, Dr. Martin admitted Mr. Brundage to the Valley 
West Hospital. A second surgery was performed on August 1, 
1977. (R. 117-118) 
Following the surgery, the plaintiff's condition began to 
improve until December of 1977. At that time while walking 
in a normal manner, he caught his heel in a rug which caused his 
weight to shift forward. While he didn't fall down or have 
any dramatic accident, he did experience an increase in his 
symptoms which have continued to the present. These symptoms, in 
the plaintiff's opinion, make it so that he cannot return to 
truck driving. (R. 118-121) Mr. Brundage is personally not 
aware of any occupation available to a man in his physical 
condition. (R. 122) No doctor has released him to return 
to work. (R. 119) 
The plaintiff has suffered a 30% physical impairment from 
all causes. 15% of that impairment is the result of the 
non-industrial accident and 15% is the result of the industrial 
accident. (R. 531) 
The various physicians who have been involved in either 
the treatment or analysis of Mr. Brundage's physical impair-
ment imply or directly state that the physical impairment 
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translates into total disablement or unemployability. Dr. 
A.F. Martin, the treating physician for the second injury 
has stated the following at various times: 
August 14, 1978 - ''It is my feeling that this 
man should not return to doing long haul driving. 
(R. 65) 
August 30, 1978 - Patient will be unable to 
do previous type of work - that of long haul 
driving. In order to become part of the work 
force again, he will have to learn some other 
trade, but that will be difficult. His sitting 
and standing capabilities are limited. (R. 202) 
December 6, 1978 - His course at the present 
time is very poor. He continues to take pain 
medication and muscle relaxants and demonstrates 
very poor lumbar spine motion with tenderness 
in the midportion of his back, loss of f lextion 
capability to approximately 30% of what one would 
expect. He is consequently unemployable at the 
present time, but by the same token, I don't think 
he was employable on August 14, 1978 either. 
(emphasis added) 
Because of concern for Mr. Brundage's condition, 
Dr. Charles Rich, who performed the first operation, was 
asked to reexamine Mr. Brundage following the second surgery. 
In total agreement with Dr. Martin, Dr. Rich stated the 
following in August of 1978: 
Sitting or walking are particularly bad for him, I tend 
to believe his symptoms are valid, and would agree it 
is best for him not to try to continue in his job as a 
line driver for IML. Were it possible for him to do 
work, for instance, in the shop which would not require 
bending or lifting he might well tolerate this but from 
a practicle standpoint it is difficult to see how h-e---
can comfortably perform the work which he is trained to 
do. It would seem, therefore, to be in his medical 
best interest to be medically retired. • • (R. 163) 
(emphasis added) 
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In June of 1978 Dr. Robert Satovick was called in for 
consultation and examination. In a letter addressed to Dr. 
Martin dated June 13, 1978 Dr. Satovick commented that: 
. . . I would agree that because of the persistence 
of the complaint and the two previous surgeries and 
the nature of his job with IML that he should go 
ahead and institute the necessary proceedings for 
medical retirment. (R. 213) 
Dr. A. James Mccalister, the doctor for IML Freight 
addressing the Driver's Personnel Department of !ML Freight 
on September 5, 1978 made the following comment: 
It seems to be the concensus of opinion, with which I 
would agree, that he probably will not be able to return 
to his former occupation and should seek some other 
line of work. (R. 217) 
With that background the matter was set for evidentiary 
hearing on January 25, 1979. At that time Dr. William H. Brown, 
a clinical psychologist with vast experience in analyzing 
injured workmen for vocational rehabilitation purposes, testifiea 
(R. 80) It was Dr. Brown's opinion that without further 
training Mr. Brundage would not be able to handle any occupation 
and none were available at the present time to the best of 
the doctor's knowledge. (R. 91, 95, 103) Dr. Brown further 
was of the opinion that with Mr. Brundage's I.Q. level he 
would not be successful in college level educational pursuits. 
(R. 93-94) Dr. Brown further stated that Mr. Brundage would 
more than likely fail in attempts at sales type duties 
because of the emotional state caused by his injuries. (R. 
94-95) It was or. Brown's recommendation that Mr. Brundage 
be referred to the experts at the Division of Vocational 
-6-
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Rehabilitation for evaluation and possible retraining for an 
alternative vocation. (R. 92, 102) 
At the time of the hearing it was Mr. Brundage's desire 
to be retrained to an alternative vocation if his physicians 
and the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation found him 
capable. (R. 122) 
Following the initial hearing, on January 29, 1979, 
the Administrative Law Judge referred plaintiff to Richard 
Olsen, a counselor with the Division of Vocational Rehabili-
tation assigned to the Industrial Commission. The purpose 
of the referral was for "Mr. Olsen [to] review possibilities 
of new job opportunities." (R. 232) Mr. Olsen's profes-
ssional opinions concerning this case will be discussed in 
detail further on in this statement of facts. 
After the initial hearing in this matter, counsel for 
defendant IML Freight felt it advisable to have an independent 
evaluation of the situation by orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Boyd 
Holbrook. Thereafter, on March 16, 1979, plaintiff was examined 
by Dr. Holbrook. Dr. Holbrook's opinion was entirely con-
sistent with the prior treating physicians that Mr. Brundage 
was totally disabled. He stated in pertinent part: 
• • • he demonstrated almost complete immobility 
of the low back. • • 
I believe at the present time that the 
applicant is totally disabled as far as 
returning to his former occupation is 
concerned. He might be able to find some 
sheltered special type of occupation con-
sistent with his present activities. • • . 
(R. 405-406) 
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During the pendency of the workmen's compensation claim 
Mr. Brundage applied for Social Security benefits. Following 
a full hearing on the Social Security Administration's 
original denial of his claim, he was found to be "not able 
to do [his] previous work • . • [and he is] unable to engage 
in any other kind of substantial gainful activity • • " 
(R. 444) At that hearing G. Barrie Nielson, a vocational 
expert called on by the Social Security Administration to 
evaluate Mr. Brundange, testified that he knew of no work 
that Mr. Brundage could perform while under his present 
physical limitations. (R. 446, 448) 
Dr. Gordon R. Kimball, an orthopedic surgeon, was 
also called upon by the Social Security Administration to 
analyze plaintiff's condition. He examined Mr. Brundage 
on August 22, 1979. Dr. Kimball found the following limi-
tations on the physical activity that could be performed by 
Mr. Brundage: 
1. During an 8 hour day he could sit no longer 
than 1 hour, stand no longer than 2 hours, 
walk no longer than 1 hour. 
2. He could lift no more than 15 pounds. 
3. He cannot use his feet and legs in 
repetitive movements as in pushing and 
pulling of leg controls. 
4. He cannot bend, squat, crawl or climb. 
s. He cannot work at unprotected heights or 
be around moving machinery. 
6. He has mild restriction to marked change 
in temperatures and humidity. 
(R. 461) 
-8-
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Dr. Kimball's recommendation was that: "This patient 
is moderately disabled for all practical purposes regarding 
any type of medium or heavy work. I believe that he could 
engage in only sedentary activities including, no lifting 
over 15 pounds, no prolonged sitting, no prolonged standing, 
or walking and no bending or twisting." (R. 460) 
Further hearing was held in this case on January 14, 
1980 at which time the medical panel chairman Dr. Nathanial 
Nord, Dr. Wayne M. Hebertson and Richard Olsen of the Division 
of Vocational Rehabilitation testified. Dr. Nord testified 
that the medical panel made no attempt and was not charged with 
making a determination of the applicant's disability or 
employability and only made a determination of the loss 
of bodily function. (R. 473) At no time at the hearing 
did Dr. Nord comment on the issue of disability or 
employability. 
Dr. Hebertson was entirely in agreement in his testimony 
with the physical limitations that Dr. Kimball placed upon 
Mr. Brundage. (R. 484) He was further of the opinion that 
there was no physical or manual labor job that Mr. Brundage 
could perform. He testified that the physical.restrictions 
are permanent in nature. (R. 485) 
On cross-examination, Dr. Hebertson testified that: 
• • • its even difficult to perceive that 
he might be able to engage in sedentary 
vocations. Because very often ••• the 
degree of sitting and standing for any 
prolonged period of time becomes a very 
limited and restrictive factor. (R. 487) 
(emphasis added) 
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Next Richard Olsen, who was assigned to the Industrial 
Commission from the Division of Rehabilitation services 
agreed with the findings of the prior vocational 
rehabilitation expert regarding the employability and retrain-
ability of Mr. Brundage. (R. 494} It is Mr. Olsen's duty 
in his capacity with the Industrial Commission to attempt to 
get industrially injured individuals back into the labor 
force. (R. 495) Mr. Olsen was familiar with the job 
market in Utah and with the Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles. (R. 496) It was his opinion that no job was 
available to Mr. Brundage under the Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles and that there was no occupation available with the 
limitations that Mr. Brundage has. (R. 498-500) 
More particularly Mr. Olsen testified that: 
It has been my experience that, when you 
place a person in the labor market, that 
there are certain minimum requirements in 
the most sedentary of jobs, and that his 
limitations preclude him functioning rn-
the labor market as we know it with those 
kinds of restrictions. 
with the set of circumstances that I 
have seen, I would say that the outcome 
[of rehabilitation efforts] would be very, 
very guarded in terms of retraining him to 
gainful employment. • . • Even though he 
might be able to do a job as far as his 
mental capabilities, given the requirements 
on the job of sitting for periods of time 
which exceeds what he has been recommended 
that he can do, would create problems for 
him in holding the job. So unless the job 
was flexable enough that they could fit 
into his set of circumstances he wouldn't 
be an acceptable candidate in the labor 
market. 
-10-
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Q Are you talking about a guarded workshop 
condition? 
A Yes. 
Q Protected workshop? 
A Basically that's what I would say. 
Q Do you know of any such that's available to 
Mr. Brundage currently? In the telephone 
solicitation for example? 
A I know of none. 
Q Do you know of any jobs available to Mr. Brundage 
in the Utah area? 
A No, I know of none in the Utah area. 
Q I want to make sure I heard you right. Did you 
say there are no sheltered workshop type jobs 
available for Mr. Brundage that you are aware of? 
A None that I am aware of. 
(R. 498-502) (emphasis added) 
On cross-examination by counsel for the Special Fund, 
Mr. Olsen was asked whether the sheltered workshop type job 
would have a tendancy to change constantly as to availability. 
Mr. Olsen answered that question indicating that there was very 
little turnover because the people in the sheltered workshop 
would not qualify for placement in the labor market and therefore 
there are very few opportunities for new individuals to 
enter into a sheltered workshop. (R. 504) 
No evidence whatsoever was introduced to rebut the evidence 
of unemployability by the numerous physicians and by the two 
vocational rehabilitation experts by any defendant to this action. 
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t .. 
Nonetheless, the Administrative Law Judge entered an order 
that was affirmed in a tie vote of one to one of the In-
dustrial Commission denying Harley Brundage benefits under 
§35-1-67 U.C.A. The sole basis in evidence for such a 
denial was that the Commission would take: 
administrative notice of the literally 
dozens of brands of home products being sold out 
of the home wherein the seller can solicit by 
telepone, by mail or door-to-door and can work as 
long as he pleases either standing up or sitting 
down or moving about as may fit his particular 
case. There are home solicitation jobs and 
mailing jobs where the solicitor can work as long 
or as little as he pleases assuming any bodily 
position he pleases and shifting that position as 
frequently as need be. I assume we could take 
administrative notice in this electronic age of many 
jobs where an employee can stand and sit on a 
stool and do the hand and finger work within the 
capabilities of a normally intelligent individual 
such as Mr. Brundage was found to be by the 
rehabilitation counselor. The applicant's request 
for a finding that he is permanently and totally 
disabled is denied." (R. 532) 
It is the position of plaintiffs that not only the 
weight of the evidence but the only evidence in this case 
is that as a result of the combination of injuries, advanced 
age, and rehabilitation potentials that Harley Brundage is 
permanently and totally disabled. The Industrial Commission 
acts without or in excess of its authority when it takes 
administrative notice of evidence not introduced by any party 
and that is directly refuted by physicians and its own voca-
tional rehabilitation expert and other vocational rehabilitation 
experts as to a claim of permanent total disability. 
Further, plaintiff takes the position that where there 
is not a majority of the Commission concurring in a denial of 
-12-
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benefits, then the injured employee, under the framework of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act has fulfilled his burden and should 
be awarded benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN NOT FINDING 
PLAINTIFF PERMANENTLY AND TOTALLY DISABLED. 
In the undisputed fact situation hereinbefore presented, 
plaintiff finds himself in what has been termed by Professor 
Arthur Larson and most authorities the "odd-lot" category. 
Professor Larson discusses the "odd-lot" doctrine in some 
detail in his learned treatise on workmen's compensation: 
"Total disability" . . . is not to be inter-
preted literally as utter and abject helpless-
ness. Evidence that claimant has been able 
to earn occasional wages-or perform certain 
kinds of gainful work does not necessarily 
rule out a finding of total disability nor 
require that it be reduced to partial .••• 
. • • Under the odd-lot doctrine, which is accepted 
in virtually every jurisdiction total dis-
ability may be found in the case of workers 
who, while not altogether incapacitated for 
work, are so handicapped that they will 
not be employed regularly in any well known 
branch of the labor market. The essence of 
the test is the probable dependability with 
which claimant can sell his services in a 
competitive labor market, undistorteq by such 
factors as business booms, sympathy of a 
particular employer or friends, temporary good 
luck, or the superhuman efforts of the claimant 
to rise above his crippling handicaps. (cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis added) 
Larson, workmen's Compensation Law, §57.51 pp. 10-107, 
10-109, 10-119. 
-13-
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As cited by Larson, the early English case of Cardiff 
Corporation v. Hall, lKB 1009 (1911) was perhaps the first to 
discuss the import of the "odd-lot" doctrine: 
There are cases in which the burden of shewing 
suitable work can in fact be obtained does 
fall upon the employer •.• [I]f ••• the 
capacities for work left to him fit him only 
for special uses and do not • • • make his 
powers of labour a merchantable article in some 
well known lines of the labour market . . . it 
is incumbent upon the employer to shew that 
such special employment can in fact be obtained 
by him •.•. [I]f the accident leaves the 
workman's labour in the position of an "odd-
lot" in the labour market, the employer must 
shew that a customer can be found who will 
take it . . . • (emphasis added) 
Judge Cordoza very early in the history of workmen's 
compensation acts in the United States set the policy for 
odd-lot determinations: 
He was an unskilled or common laborer. 
He coupled his request for employment with 
notice that labor must be light. The ap-
plicant imposing such conditions is quickly 
put aside for more versatiel competitors. 
Business has little patience with the suitor 
for ease and favor. He is the 'odd-lot' 
man, the nondescript in the labor market. 
Work if he gets it, is likely to be casual 
and intermittent . • • • Rebuff, if suf-
fered, might reasonably be ascribed to the 
narrow opportunities that await the sick 
and the halt. (emphasis added) 
Jordan v. Decorative Co., 130 N.E. 634 at 635-~36 (N.Y. 1921) 
The unrebutted evidence in the case at bar shows plain-
tiff to be in that category of "narrow opportunities that 
await the sick and the halt." He is indeed an "odd-lot" 
employee. 
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As Judge Moulton ascribed in Cardiff Corp. v. Hall, supra, 
the burden should be on the appropriate defendant to aff irma-
tively show employability once prima facie unemployability 
is shown by the applicant. A number of examples of that 
burden in practice can be shown from decisions in neighboring 
jurisdictions to Utah. In Brown v. Safeway Stores, 483 P.2d 
305 (N.M. 1971) the plaintiff was an 18 year old boy, had 
a high school education, was trained to plant cucumbers 
and potatoes, and suffered from an injured back. The Court 
concluded that he might be employed at something, but that 
there was no evidence of that in the record to support such 
a finding. Therefore, the Court found the injured employee 
to be totally disabled. The defendant contended that the 
burden was on the plaintiff to show that he was disabled 
from doing any work for which he was fitted by age, education, 
training and previous experience. To that the Court responded: 
We agree that the proof of the disability is 
on the plaintiff, but after plaintiff has intro-
duced evidence as to his age, education, 
training, and mental capacity, the burden of 
coming forward is on the defendant. It is much 
easier for the defendant to prove the employ-
ability of the plaintiff for a particular job 
than for plaintiff to try to prove the 
universal negative of not being employ-
able at any work. If the defendant chooses 
to stand on the evidence introduced by 
plaintiff and not rebut the evidence, 
he may run a great risk since the issue 
may become one of substantial evidence, 
which is not a question of quantity but 
substance. (emphasis added) 
483 P.2d at 308. 
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Oregon has similary ruled in the case of Swinson v. 
Westport Lumber, 470 P.2d 1005 (Or. 1971). Therein, the 
applicant was a 63 year old man who had a 60% disability of 
the right leg and sustained a serious low back injury. He 
was restricted from heavy lifting, stooping, squating, 
bending and could not walk more than four or five blocks 
without experiencing additional pain. He could not sit, 
stand, or lie in one position for a prolonged period of 
time. In Oregon, the Supreme Court is given the power to revi~ 
denovo the entire record. Upon review of the entire record 
and in response to the defendant's claim that he could be 
employed in light work the Supreme Court made an award of 
permanent total disability. The Court commented as follows 
in supporting its opinion: 
Total disability under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act does not mean permanent 
utter happlessness. (Case cited) The 
fact that a claimant is capable of performing 
some light work or earning occasional wages 
does not necessarily preclude a finding of 
total disability. • . • This rule is essen-
tially ... the so called 'odd-lot' doctrine. 
It is a well recognized principle of work-
men's compensation law that a claimant -
workman must prove that he has sustained 
a compensable injury. (Cases cited) Where, 
however, does the burden of proof lie in 
circumstances such as those before us 
now? Claimant contends that since he is 
clearly in the 'odd-lot' category, defendant's 
have the burden of showing the availability 
of regular, suitable employment. Defendants 
argue that the claimant must prove his is an 
'odd-lot' employee and that he has not done 
so. 
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The Court went on to approvingly cite Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law: 
• . . opinions have stressed that the burden 
is on the employer to prove the availability 
of steady work, once the claimant has been 
shown to be in the 'odd-lot' category. There 
is no presumption that, merely because claimant 
is physically able to do light work, appropriate 
employment is regularly available to him. 
If the evidence of degree of obvious 
physical impairment, coupled with other factors, 
such as claimant's mental capacity, education, 
training, or age places claimant prima facie 
in the 'odd-lot' category, the burden should 
be on the employer to show that some kind of 
suitable work is regularly and continously 
available to the claimant . . • • (emphasis added) 
The Oregon Supreme Court followed the above decision with 
a similar opinion favoring a claimant who was 54 years of age 
when he suffered a back injury resulting in a permanent partial 
loss of bodily function of 25%. See Barley v. Morrison-Knudsen, 
479 P.2d 1005 (Ore. 1971). 
In Employers Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
541 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1975), the Arizona Supreme Court found that 
an employee with similar restrictions to those of plaintiff in 
the case at bar was permanently and totally disabled. The 
Court placed the burden on the defendant of showing available 
and suitable employment: 
Absent proof of employment reasonably 
available to one in the 'odd-lot' category 
the injured employee may be classified as 
totally disabled. • 
we turn next to the question as to whether 
the employer and carrier met the burden of 
showing available and suitable employment 
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in presenting evidence about possible employ-
ment as a hoist operator. The evidence re-
flected that such employment was available in 
the Tucson area less than 30 days a year. It 
was not shown that no bending would be required 
or that hoist operators were always free to 
change positions at will. Such evidence falls 
far short of that required to establish avail-
able and suitable employment. 
The failing in the instant case is far greater than even 
that in the Employer Mutual Life Insurance case from Arizona. 
Here no evidence whatsoever was presented to refute the unem-
ployability of Mr. Brundage as a result of the combination of 
injuries from which he suffers. 
In similar circumstances the Idaho Supreme Court has stated 
that where the evidence is undisputed and is reasonably 
susceptible to only one interpretation, whether a claimant 
falls within the odd-lot category is a conclusion of law. 
In the same case the Court held that where the individual 
does fall within the odd-lot category the burden is on 
the defendant to show some kind of suitable work is regularly 
and continuously available to an injured workman. The Court 
did so by reversing an Industrial Commission decision denying 
benefits to an injured employee. Lyons v. Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund, 565 P.2d 1360 (Idaho 1977). 
At page 10-137 in Larson, supra, on the issue of the 
burden under the odd-lot doctrine Professor Larson states at footnote 
26, "Of course, if claimant ••• can put in evidence 
affirmatively showing that light work is not available, his 
case is that much stronger." 
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With that framework of the law and policy considerations from 
other jurisdictions, it is now appropriate to discuss the law 
in Utah. 
For the convenience of the Court §35-1-67 U.C.A. upon 
which a permanent total award is predicated is set out in 
pertinent part below: 
. . . a finding by the commission of permanent 
total disability shall in all cases be tenta-
tive and not final until such time as the 
following proceedings have been had: Where the 
employee has tentatively been found to be per-
manently and totally disabled, 1) it shall be 
mandatory that the industrial commission of 
Utah ref er such employee to the division of 
vocational rehabilitation under the state 
board of education for rehabilitation training 
and it shall be the duty of the commission to 
order paid to such vocational rehabilitation 
division, out of that special fund provided 
for by section 35-1-68(1), not to exceed 
$1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and 
training of such employee; the rehabilitation 
and training of such employee shall generally 
follow the practice applicable under section 
35-1-69, and relating to the rehabilitation 
of employees having combined injuries. If and 
when the division of vocational rehabilitation 
under the state board of education certifies 
to the industrial commission of Utah • • • 
that such employee has fully co-operated with 
the division of vocational rehabilitation in 
its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the 
opinion of the division the employee may not 
be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order 
that there be paid to such employee weekly 
benefits . • • • 1) for such period of time 
beginning with the time that the payments (as 
in this section provided) to be made by the 
employer or its insurance carrier terminate 
and ending with the death of the employee. 
* * * * * 
The division of vocational rehabilitation 
shall at the termination of the vocational 
training of the employee, certify to the 
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industrial commission of Utah the work the 
employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon 
the commission shall, after notice of the em-
ployer and an opportunity to be heard, dete~­
mine whether the employee has, notwithstanding 
such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily 
function. (emphasis added) 
The first Utah case discussing the relative burdens in 
proving permanent and total disability is Caillet v. Industrial 
Cornrn'n, 58 P.2d 760. (Utah 1936). There the Industrial 
Commission had denied that the applicant was permanently and 
totally disabled. The Court found: 
The evidence in this case • • • conclusively 
show[s] that the plaintiff is permanently 
and totally disabled from either securing 
or performing work of the general character 
that he was performing when injured. He 
by such evidence established a prima facie 
case, and in the absence of any showing that 
he is able to secure and perform work of a 
special nature not generally available, 
he is as a matter of law, entitled to an 
award as and for permanent total disability. 
(cases cited) No evidence was offered or 
received before the Commission which showed, 
or tended to show, that plaintiff is able 
to secure employment of a special nature not 
generally available or that he is able to 
perform the duties of such employment. The 
evidence is all to the contrary. 
Upon this record plaintiff as a matter of law is 
entitled to compensation as and for permanent 
total disability. • . . (emphasis added) 
That is clearly the status of the case before the court 
at this point in time. Caillet, supra shows that the law 
in the State of Utah as early as 1936 placed the burden on 
the defendants to show availability of special work once the 
applicant has shown its unavailability. Additionally, "to 
make out a case of total disability, the applicant is not 
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required to show that he incapacitated from performing any 
and all kinds of work." Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 277 P. 206 (Utah 1929). 
In the Morrison-Knudsen Construction Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 424 P.2d 138 (Utah 1967) the Utah Supreme court 
again delineated the test of a permanent total disability: 
••• [T]hat a workman may be found totally 
disabled if by reason of the disability re-
sulting from his injury he cannot perform 
work of the general character he was perform-
ing when injured, or any other work which a 
man of his capabilities may able to do or 
to learn to do • . . . 
In light of the overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence 
and under the tests of the Utah Supreme Court, the only 
conclusion that is supported by the evidence is that Harley 
Brundage is permanently and totally disabled. The case of 
Beverly R. Buxton v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 587 P.2d 
1 (Utah 1978) is precisely in point. Therein the Court succinctly 
stated the status of a claimant's rights when a combination· 
of injuries takes the individual from the work force. The 
Court was presented with the factual situation where the ap-
plicant, due to a combination of pre-existing as well as 
industrial injuries, was made unemployable. The testimony of 
her treating physician to that point was unrebutted. The only additional 
evidence presented in that case was that of the applicant her-
self indicating that she was totally disabled. No defendant, 
as in the case before the Commission now, made any effort to 
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refute the evidence of her treating physician or herself that 
she was totally disabled. The Court analyzed the situation 
as follows: 
. . . the Commission is not vested with 
arbitrary powers; and it cannot simply 
ignore competent and credible evidence when 
there is nothing discrediting therein and 
there is no evidence to the contrary • 
• • • it is the Commission's duty to determine 
whether that loss of function represents 
total disability in terms of capacity 
to perform remunerative employment, and the 
determination must be based on competent 
evidence. 
• • • if after a substantial permanent partial 
disability award is made, it is discovered 
empirically that that injured employee is not 
employable with his disability and it is 
certified that he cannot be vocationally 
rehabilitated despite his cooperation there 
is prima facie justification (subject, of course, 
to refutation) for changing the disability~ __ _ 
rating from partial to total. 
In the case at bar, it has been certified by Richard Olsen, 
the Commission's vocational rehabilitation expert that despite 
the cooperation of Mr. Brundage, he cannot be vocationally 
rehabilitated. There is no refutation of that evidence. 
Further, as in the Buxton case: 
Plaintiff's testimony about (her) condition 
of pain and disability, although admittedly 
subjective, is corroberated by the medical 
evidence, and without any indication or 
suggestion that (her) affliction and inability 
is other than genuine. 
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The decision of the Industrial Commission places plaintiff 
in a very real and tragic dilemma. On the one hand, plaintiff 
expressed a sincere desire to be employed. 
be rehabilitated through training. (R. 122) 
He was willing to 
He qualified for 
such training as was statutorily available pursuant ot §§35-1-67 
and 35-1-69 U.C.A. He was referred to the Division of Voca-
tional Rehabilitation by the Industrial Commission. (R. 232) 
The vocational rehabilitation expert attached to the Commission 
testified that the plaintiff, though willing, was not a 
candidate for rehabilitation. His physical limitations 
would make it impossible for him to complete the rehabilitation 
courses. Even if he could complete rehabilitation, no jobs 
would be available to him. (See Statement of Facts) Other 
vocational rehabilitation experts concurred in that pro-
position. (R. 446, 448) 
On the other hand, the Commission, contrary to the 
uncontroverted certification of its own independent expert, 
denied that plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled. 
That is completely contrary to the mandate of §35-1-67 U.C.A. 
that when the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation is of 
the opinion, " . • • the employee may not be rehabilitated, 
then the Commission shall . order that compensation be 
paid for the remainder of the employee's life." Not only is 
the Commission's decision unfair to a man who makes a good 
faith effort to be rehabilitated, it is cruel " rebuff, 
if suffered, might reasonably be ascribed to the narrow 
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POINT II 
THE COMMISSION CANNOT TAKE ADMINISTRATIVE 
NOTICE OF FACTS CONTRARY TO COMPETENT, 
CREDIBLE, UNCONTROVERTED, IMPARTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
The major premise upon which the Commission based its 
denial of the benefits claimed by the plaintiff, is that jobs 
were available in home solicitation and benchwork employment. 
(R. 532) Though the defendant employer and the defendant 
Special Fund, did not have or present any evidence; evidence 
of Dr. Hebertson, Dr. Brown, Richard Olson, the Social Security 
Administration, G. Barrie Nielson, and the plaintiff himself 
showed that no such jobs were available to the plaintiff. The 
Conunission wrongfully took administrative notice of facts 
not in evidence that were directly controverted by competent, 
substantive evidence most of which could not be claimed to 
be tainted by bias and prejudice. The Commission stepped 
out of its impartial fact finder role to become an advocate 
against the plaintiff by rel~eving defendants of their 
burden. 
Rule 9 of the ntah Rules of Evidence states in pertinent 
part: 
Judicial notice shall be taken without request 
by a party ... of propositions of generalized 
knowledge as are so universally known that 
they cannot reasonably be the subject o'fdispute. 
Judicial notice may be taken without request by 
a party of . . . such facts as are so generally 
known or of such common notoriety within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the court that they 
cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute. • . • 
(emphasis added) 
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Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that this 
Court can review the rulings of the judge under Rule 9, 
supra. Plaintiff puts it to this Court that it is incredible 
that the Commission could even remotely find that the uncon-
troverted evidence of unemployability in this case is so 
fanciful that it " . . . cannot reasonably be the subject of 
dispute." It appears probable that this extreme misapplication 
of administrative notice has·crept into these proceedings because 
the Order was written without reference to the transcript of 
the second hearing. (R. 465) In fact, the tanscript was 
not even requested by the Commissioners who were to review 
the record on plaintiff's Motion for Review until March 21, 
1980 - ten days after the plaintiff's Motion for Review had 
been denied. (R. 465, 548) 
When one couples all of the above with the hornbook 
workman's compensation law that reasonable doubt as to statutory 
and rule construction should be resolved in favor of the injured 
employee, a grave misjustice has taken place in this case. 
See, i.e. McPhie v. Industrial Cornrn'n, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 
1977); M&K Corp. v. Industrial Cornrn'n, 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 
1948); and Park Utah Consol. Mine Co. v. Industrial Cornrn'n, 
36 P.2d 979 (1934). 
This Court based on the authoirty of Rule 12 U.R.E. should 
find the administrative notice of the Commission improper and 
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remand the case for an order that plaintiff is permanently 
and totally disabled as the only competent evidence in the 
record would indicate. 
POINT III 
IF A MAJORITY OF THE COMMISSION DOES 
NOT VOTE TO SUSTAIN AN ORDER DENYING 
BENEFITS, THEN THE BENEFITS SHOULD 
BE ORDERED. 
This case presents a most unique situation. As the Court 
will recognize, the Industrial Commission is made up of the 
three Commissioners. In order for the Commission to conduct 
business a quorum or majority must be present and partici-
pating. §35-1-6 U.C.A. In the instant case Commissioner 
Milton E. Saathoff disqualified himself. Commissioner Carlyle 
F. Gronning was of the opinion that the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge should be sustained. Commissioner 
Stephen M. Hadley, the Chairman and only attorney of the three, 
expressed the opinion that an award of permanent total 
disability should be made. 
§35-1-82.54 U.C.A. states that upon referral of a 
case to it by the Administrative Law Judge, the Commission 
after a review of the entire record shall enter its award. 
Nowhere in the Act is there an indication of what is to 
be done in the event the quorum vote results in a tie. 
It is submitted to this Court that just as many of the 
commissioners voted for plaintiff as against. The general 
rule of statutory construction in workman's compensation cases 
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breaks that deadlock. 
A further equally recognized rule of con-
struction resolves any doubt respecting the right 
of compensation in favor of the injured 
employee . . • and compensation statues should 
be liberally construed in favor of recovery. 
McPhie v. Industrial Cornm'n, supra. 
The plaintiff is entitled to his award. 
POINT IV 
THOUGH PLAINTIFF ISN'T PARTICULAR ABOUT 
THE SOURCE OF COMPENSATION, IT APPEARS 
THAT THE EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY IS LIMITED 
BY §35-1-69 U.C.A. 
Though plaintiff isn't particular about the source of 
the benefits he receives as a permanently and totally disabled 
workman, in order to avoid delay in receiving compensation and 
to avoid a potential future appeal, this Court should make 
a ruling as to the responsible party or parties. 
Plaintiff is of the opinion that the 1977 decision in 
McPhie v. Industrial Cornm'n, supra is determinative. Therein, 
the Court interpreted §§35-1-67 and 35-1-69 U.C.A. in combin-
ation as meaning that the employer would be responsible for 
the injury incurred during the employee's employment with that 
particular employer. See also, Intermountain Health Care 
v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977); White et al. v. Industrial 
Cornm'n, 604 P.2d 478 (Utah 1979); and Intermountain Smelting 
v. Anthony Capitano, Sup. Ct. No. 16530 (March 24, 1980). 
Here, the employer would be responsible for_the-15% per-
manent partial loss of bodily function attributable to the 
-27-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
industrial accident, and his proportionate share of the medicali 
and temporary total benefits. The Second Injury Fund should 
be responsible for the remainder for plaintiff's lifetime. 
CONCLUSION 
The uncontroverted facts of this case show that plaintiff 
has a 30% loss of bodily function with 15% of that predating 
his industrial injury. All of the witnesses testified that 
plaintiff is totally disabled from his former employment. 
A clinical psychologist, at least two vocational rehabilitation 
specialists, the Social Security Administration, and independent 
as well as treating physicians were of the opinion that no 
jobs whatsoever would be available to the plaintiff. Because 
of that situation and the very severe physical limitations 
resulting from the combination of injuries, the vocational 
rehabilitation expert of the Industrial Commission to whom 
the Commission referred plaintiff, certified under oath that 
plaintiff was not a candidate for rehabilitation. No evidence 
whatsoever was introduced by any party to controvert the 
above facts. 
The plaintiff, therefore, falls into the "odd-lot" doc-
trine placing the burde~ on defendants to present affirmative 
evidence that there is a regular job opportunity in the labor 
market available to the plaintiff. Absent that, §35-1-67 
mandates that " •.. the Commission shall order that there be 
paid to such employee weekly benefits . • • for such period 
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of time beginning with the time that the payments ... to 
be made by the employer . . . terminate and ending with 
the death of the employee." 
The Commission erred in taking administrative notice of 
the availability to plaintiff of benchwork and telephone and 
mail solicitation jobs. There was unbiased, competent and 
uncontroverted evidence to the contrary by plaintiff's wit-
nesses and the Commission's own expert. This Court should 
review the propriety of the administrative notice as allowed 
by Rule 12(2) U.R.E. The Court cannot help but find that the 
availability of such jobs to this plaintiff is not a " 
position of generalized knowledge ... so universally known 
that [it] cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute." Rule 
pro-
9 U.R.E. It was beyond fairness and justice for the Commission 
to so shift the burden of proof in such an arbitrary and capricious 
manner. 
The Commission sustained the Administrative Law Judge's 
decision with one Commissioner voting to sustain it, one 
Commissioner voting to award the benefits, and the third 
Conunissioner disqualifying himself. The statutes are silent 
on how to resolve such a deadlock. In that event the 
rules of statutory construction in a workman's·compensation 
case require that any doubt be resolved in favor of awarding 
compensation. 
Finally, §§35-1-67 and 35-1-69 U.C.A. would appear 
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to limit the employer's liability to the industrial injury 
only. When combined injuries result in permanent total dis-
ability, the Second Injury Fund should pay the remainder. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Industrial Com-
mission acted beyond its power and authority in a capricious 
and arbitrary manner in denying plaintiff permanent total 
compensation contrary to the unequivocal and unrebutted evidence, 
This case should be reversed-and remanded with instructions 
to the Commission to enter an order for the benefits requested 
herein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ day of May, 1980. 
BLACK & MOORE 
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